








As a 2011 deadline approaches for reform or renewal of the Bank 
of Canada’s inflation-targeting program, questions arise about how the
Bank’s responsibilities for ensuring the financial system’s stability are
exercised under such a regime. The current financial crisis underlines
the urgency of these issues.
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MONETARY POLICYThe current financial crisis is creating a plethora of visible and immediate
policy problems, but it also raises longer-run questions about the adequacy of
inflation targeting as a basis for Canada’s monetary regime, which this
Commentary addresses.
Asset price bubbles and the excessive swings in real economic activity that
typically accompany them seem less likely to develop when a broad inflation
measure like Canada’s CPI is targeted, and when long upswings in inflation,
even at low overall levels, are not permitted to gain momentum. But beyond
these considerations, because bubbles are usually sector specific, conventional
monetary policy is unsuitable for their pre-emption, a task better delegated to
regulators. 
There is no certain way of avoiding asset market instability, however, so a
central bank that targets inflation must also be the financial system’s lender of
last resort. These tasks are complementary. Inflation falls in the wake of
financial crises, so monetary expansion is called for on both counts, while the
exchange rate flexibility needed to support inflation targeting permits interest
rates to be lowered as part of the policy package, as they could not be under a
fixed exchange rate regime. 
The 2011 monetary policy agreement between the Bank of Canada and the
Minister of Finance should explicitly recognize the Bank of Canada’s lender-
of-last-resort role. It might also pay attention to minimizing the scope for
prolonged inflation upswings to develop, a consideration that argues against a
shift to price level targeting and also points to the desirability of strengthening
the upper boundary of inflation’s target range. 
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A
sset market instability has been
at the centre of the monetary
policy scene in Canada and just
about everywhere else for more than 
a year now – this at the very time when
the review of Canada’s inflation target-
ing program announced in November
2006 (Bank of Canada 2006) as a
prelude to its possible reform in 2011
has been getting under way.
Monetary policymakers around the world had
already begun to pay systematic and serious attention
to financial stability issues long before the current
crisis began in mid-2007.
1 Its unfolding, however,
has lent a very practical tone to recent local dis-
cussions (see for example, Engert, Selody, and
Wilkins 2008) about the role central banks should
play as they cooperate with the various regulatory
agencies with whom they share responsibilities in this
area. The 2011 deadline for the renewal and potential
reform of Canada’s inflation-targeting monetary
policy regime, moreover, gives particular immediacy
to questions about how – and even whether – the
Bank of Canada can effectively strengthen and
support the economy’s apparently unstable financial
foundations if low- to medium-term inflation
continues to be its sole explicit policy goal. 
Some observers have suggested that a benign macro-
economic environment, such as many countries have
enjoyed since the mid-1990s, helps weaken financial
systems by lulling participants into careless decisions
that have taken insufficient account of risk, and that a
narrowly focused monetary policy regime like Canada’s
is therefore inadequate. This Commentary extends the
carefully nuanced skepticism of Freedman and Goodlet
(2007) about this view by stressing complementarities
between the pursuit of low inflation and the main-
tenance of financial stability. We argue both that success
on the inflation front enhances the chances of main-
taining stability without quite guaranteeing it, and that,
when instability does arise, prompt and vigorous
attention to it by the relevant authorities, including the
central bank, can help to keep inflation on track. Even
so, we also argue that the precise characteristics of the
inflation-targeting regime can influence these inter-
actions, and therefore we end with a brief discussion of
the characteristics most likely to support financial
system stability. 
A Brief Overview
We begin by discussing competing views about how
low and stable inflation affects the vulnerability of asset
markets to instability, arguing that it helps in this
regard, albeit without offering any cast-iron guarantees.
We specifically suggest, as a corollary, that a little more
attention in recent years to the behaviour of overall
inflation on the part of the US Federal Reserve might
have led it to tighten its policies earlier and helped avoid
the worst excesses of the housing market bubble, whose
bursting precipitated the current crisis; we make a
similar case about the Bank of England.
We then outline our views on how asset market
bubbles develop, paying particular attention to how
they can occur even against a background of low overall
inflation. Here, we stress the limits imposed on the use
of orthodox monetary policy to forestall bubbles by the
fact that its effects are economy wide, while bubbles are
usually phenomena of particular sectors. Turning to the
deployment of lender-of-last-resort activities by the
central bank as a means of coping with the financial
crises that typically follow the bursting of bubbles, we
argue that, appropriately coordinated with conventional
interest rate policies, the deployment of such activities is
consistent with the ongoing pursuit of medium-term
inflation targets. 
Finally, we outline some implications of our
analysis for the 2011 monetary policy agreement
between the Bank of Canada and the minister of
finance. We suggest that the Bank of Canada’s
responsibilities for supporting financial sector
stability in its lender-of-last-resort capacity should be
recognized explicitly, and that it should continue to
set policy targets for an inclusive consumer price
index (CPI) rather than a narrower core index that
abstracts from important categories of expenditure.
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2 The list of BIS publications on this matter is long. A representative sample of contributions, where references to other papers can also be found, includes
Crockett (1999); Borio and Lowe (2002); and Borio and White (2003). The BIS approach has strong echoes of some of the interwar literature on financial
stability, surveyed by one of the present authors (not by co-incidence) in another BIS publication (see Laidler 2003). Many of these themes were also
sounded from the 1960s onwards by the at-the-time lonely voice of Hyman Minsky (see Minsky 1982 for a representative collection of his work). On the
historical continuity of these ideas and their relationship to the economic history which helped to generate them, see Bordo and Wheelock (2004).
There is also something to be said for configuring
the new regime so as to make it difficult for
prolonged upswings in inflation, even at a low
average rate, to get under way. To that end, we
suggest that the upper boundary of any target range
for inflation might be made a firmer constraint on
policy than it currently is, and that inflation
targeting looks more attractive than price-level
targeting. An important caveat that accompanies
these conclusions, however, is that they arise from
analysis that gives pride of place to consideration of
financial stability and that other factors might not
always point in the same direction. 
Low Inflation and Asset Market
Instability 
Recent asset market instability seems to have
taken many by surprise, but it was foreseen by some
important commentators. In particular, as long ago
as the late 1990s, while the so-called dot-com
bubble was developing, the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) began to warn that the seemingly
benign inflationary environment of that period was
masking growing fragility in financial markets.
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Although the BIS has a rather low profile among
the public at large, it provides the venue where
central bankers from around the world meet
regularly to discuss policy concerns of mutual
interest, and it has also long been closely associated
with the international coordination of regulatory
policies toward the financial sector. The label
“central bankers’ central bank” that is sometimes
attached to the BIS exaggerates both its powers and
influence, but it is safe to say that all monetary poli-
cymakers who mattered were aware of its warnings
even if they did not act on them. Although bygones
are now bygones, it is still worth asking whether
these warnings yield any lessons for future policy. 
The BIS View
Briefly, the BIS argued that the stable low-inflation
environment of the 1990s had led participants in
asset markets to underestimate the risks they were
taking, making those markets ever more vulnerable
to speculative excesses, and hence to sudden
collapses. And after the dot-com bubble burst in
2000, the BIS argued that the monetary ease that
came in its wake threatened to create even more
trouble in the future. Two policy implications
seemed to follow. The first was that monetary
authorities, as well as pursuing low inflation, ought
to keep an eye open for emerging asset market
bubbles and be prepared to act to prevent them
from gathering momentum, even if that meant
taking measures not also required in pursuit of their
immediate goals for the inflation rate. The second
implication was that, should they fail to the point of
having to cope with an asset market collapse,
monetary authorities ought to be wary about the
amount of support they then provided to the
financial system in its wake, lest this encourage even
more foolhardiness in future. 
Recent events in the United States and elsewhere
seem at first sight to bear much of this out. Although
inflation did move up a little in the late 1990s as the
dot-com bubble got under way, it evidently remained
low enough to trigger no alarms. The Federal Reserve
did little to discourage this bubble’s development, and
vigorous efforts by both the fiscal and monetary
authorities to keep the economy expanding after it
burst were in due course followed by a housing
boom, whose own collapse is now having worldwide
repercussions. Once again, just as in 2001, the Fed
and other central banks are working hard to prevent
financial market problems driving real economies
into deep and prolonged recession. In light of past
experience, it is hard to avoid asking whether, in
doing so, they are simply setting the scene for yet
more asset market problems in future.
Canada’s monetary policy regime is centred on a
specific numerical target – 2 percent inflation with a
margin of error between 1 and 3 percent around it –
for the CPI. Although this regime has been a
remarkable success over the past decade-and-a-half
when judged on its own terms, it has encountered
some difficulty as the recent crisis has evolved. HasCommentary 278 | 3
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its very simplicity left it vulnerable to asset market
instability and, in 2011, should it be modified to
deal with this potential flaw? 
Inflation Targeting as a Source of 
Economic Stability
The almost uninterrupted post-1991 expansion of
market economies, in which Canada was a full par-
ticipant, made it all too easy to forget that the
so-called business cycle – a repeated pattern of
expansion and contraction, often quite sharp in the
latter phase – has been a fact of life ever since
market economies began to emerge in the
eighteenth century. The earliest name given to this
phenomenon was the credit cycle, a reliable
testament to the prominent role that financial
markets have always played in it, and it is not sur-
prising that the task of coping with the cycle has
been widely regarded as one for central banks from
their very beginnings. Ideas about just what such
coping might entail have, of course, changed
radically over time, but today’s focus on stabilizing
the inflation rate is usefully thought of as being
simply the latest stage in this evolution.
3
By and large, the hopes vested in monetary
policies focused on inflation control – that cyclical
swings in inflation and real output would indeed be
stabilized – have been fulfilled since the mid-1990s,
to the point that the succeeding period has been
labelled the great moderation.
4This improvement
began even sooner in some places, including Canada,
that were early off the mark in putting explicit
inflation targets in place. But it also occurred
elsewhere, not least in the United States, where it
began even earlier as stable inflation began to be
pursued in the 1980s, albeit less single-mindedly
than would have been the case under a formal
targeting regime. Even so, another hope – namely,
that the asset market instability that also traditionally
accompanied the cycle might also be mitigated – has
been sadly and obviously disappointed. 
This should not have come as a total surprise.
Two periods of smooth real expansion accompanied
by low and stable inflation that ended in ruinous
asset market crises were well known even before the
great moderation got under way: the later 1920s in
the United States, where the collapse of the stock
market in October 1929 heralded the Great
Depression; and the later 1980s in Japan, where the
subsequent demise of the “bubble economy”
ushered in the “lost decade” of the 1990s. Figures 1
and 2 display consumer price inflation rates during
these episodes, alongside a major equity price index,
and show just how benign the inflationary envi-
ronment seemed before asset market trouble struck,
particularly in the United States in the 1920s. When
hindsight is applied to Japan, the matter is a little
less clear-cut: although inflation remained suffi-
ciently low in the late 1980s and early 1990s that it
caused no contemporary concern, it nevertheless
rose steadily from 1987 onwards; in this respect, the
Japanese experience seemed to foreshadow recent
experience in North America.
Inflation and Recent Episodes of Asset Market
Instability
Figures 3 and 4 present data for the United States
and Canada since the mid-1990s that are com-
parable to those displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Here,
it is particularly instructive to compare the
behaviour of consumer price inflation in the United
States and Canada in the two intervals bounded by
the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in September 1998, the stock market
collapse that began in March 2000, and the collapse
of the market for asset-backed commercial paper in
September 2007. 
During the first interval, there was something of a
run up in the inflation rate in both countries, but
better defined, starting earlier, and reaching a higher
peak that was sustained longer in the United States.
These differences are surely a result of those countries’
3 A particularly readable account of these hopes, which pays particular attention to the reasons for expecting stable inflation to contribute to asset
market stability, is that of Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
4 This now widely used phrase seems to have been coined by Stock and Watson (2002). Some commentators, with benefit of hindsight and perhaps
concentrating on US experience, fix the beginning of the moderation in the mid- to late 1980s. However, given the instability encountered in both
Europe and Canada at the beginning of the 1990s, we find this hard to defend. Before the event, some commentators seem to have expected
greater stability in inflation to be accompanied by less rather than more stability in real variables. See Walsh (2008) for a discussion of this





























Dow Jones Industrial Index –
December Close (Right Scale)
Figure 1: USA 1920s – Inflation versus Stock Market Performance
Sources: Bureau of Labour Statistics and Dow Jones & Company.
CPI Growth Rate
(Left Scale)
Nikkei 225 Index –



















































Figure 2: Japan – Inflation versus Stock Market Performance, 1985-1996
Sources: OECD and Yahoo Finance.Commentary 278 | 5
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Figure 3: USA – Inflation versus Stock Market Performance, 1995-2008
Sources: Bureau of Labour Statistics and Dow Jones & Company.
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Figure 4: Canada – Inflation versus Stock Market Performance, 1995-2008
Source: Statistics Canada.| 6 Commentary 278
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monetary authorities responding differently to the
Russian and subsequent LTCM crises, but inflation
in neither Canada nor the United States reached
levels that attracted policymakers’ attention even
under the former’s formal 1-to-3 percent targeting
regime. The corresponding differences between the
two countries after 2001, however, are more marked.
US inflation moved up sharply once the Fed’’s
response to the collapse of the dot-com bubble took
hold, and continued to rise erratically towards 4
percent, where, after a brief respite, it remains at the
time of writing. Canada mimicked US behaviour
only until early 2003, when inflation actually spiked
above the US rate for a month or so, but thereafter
fell back below 3 percent and remained there until
the late summer of 2008.
A comparison of the two countries’ targets for
their policy interest rates – in Canada, the overnight
rate, and in the United States, the federal funds rate
(see Figure 5) – strongly suggests that this difference
in outcomes was related to the fact that monetary
policy was self-consciously tightened earlier in
Canada, a fact surely related in turn to the Bank of
Canada’s pursuit of a formal 2 percent inflation
target for the CPI and to the lack of a similar com-
mitment on the part of the Fed.
The Importance of Targeting the Right Price Index 
Even so, the Fed was not inattentive to inflation
during the period. Though lacking a formal target
and, indeed, operating under a “dual mandate” that
requires it to pay attention to the performance of
the real economy, the Fed was well known to be
working with an inflation “comfort zone” of around
1.5 to 2 percent.
5 Crucially, however, this informal
target was not for the local counterpart of Canada’s
5 The significance of this dual mandate is much discussed in US debates, and some contributors, notably former Fed governor Frederic Mishkin
(2008), argue that though it requires the Fed to aim at the best real performance that the economy is capable of sustaining, this does not conflict
with the pursuit of a stable inflation target. Mishkin also argues, however, for the suitability of a core inflation measure for targeting, partly on the
grounds that it would lead to smaller policy-induced output fluctuations than does a broader “headline” index. We wonder, in the light of our
































Canada Overnight Target Rate USA Federal Funds Target Rate
Figure 5: Canada Overnight Target Rate and USA Federal Funds Target Rate
Sources: Bank of Canada and Federal Reserve Board.Commentary 278 | 7
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6 For discussions of these issues in a specifically Canadian context, see, for example, the exchange between Laidler and Aba (2000) and Macklem
(2001). See also Mishkin (2008) and the references, mainly to US literature, therein.
CPI but for the core personal consumption
expenditure (PCE) deflator, which is unsuitable as
an anchor for a formal inflation-targeting regime.
Compared to the appropriately labelled headline
CPI, the PCE deflator is badly understood by the
public, available only with a significant time lag,
and subject to post-publication revisions. On the
other hand, as a chain-weighted index that con-
tinuously updates the consumption bundle whose
price it monitors, the PCE deflator is less prone to
upward bias in measuring inflation than is the fixed-
weight CPI, which takes account of the proclivity of
consumers to substitute away from those goods
whose prices are rising most rapidly only when its
weights are intermittently updated. Thus, to this
extent, the usually lower measures of inflation that
the PCE tends to yield (see Figure 6) are more
accurate, a characteristic that perhaps enhances its
suitability as a gauge of central bank “comfort.”
However, the even lower estimates of inflation
yielded by stripping the PCE deflator of its food
and energy components to arrive at a measure of
“core” inflation seem to have lulled the Fed into a
false sense of security after 2001.
The pros and cons of core inflation measures are
by now widely understood, so suffice it here to
assert that, although they provide a useful way of
“seeing through” short-term volatility in measured
inflation when food and energy prices are fluc-
tuating around average levels that remain constant
over time relative to those of other goods, they
become misleading when relative prices are
themselves changing.
6 Specifically, when the relative
prices of food and/or energy are rising over the long
term, as they have been in recent years, a price index
that ignores them systematically underestimates the
overall inflation rate. 
It is this effect that mainly accounts for the failure
of the Fed’s favoured measure of inflation to catch
the rise of inflation in recent years. Figure 7 shows
that this index’s Canadian counterpart – the core









































CPI (All Items) PCE Deflator 'Core' PCE Deflator (excluding food and energy)
Figure 6: USA – CPI, PCE and Core PCE, Year-over-Year Growth Rates, Quarterly
Sources: Bureau of Labour Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis.(CPIC) – would have similarly misled policymakers
had they been paying much attention to it, but
because Canada is an inflation targeter focused on
the CPI, no one was. One could argue that, over the
same period, the Bank of Canada paid too much
attention to the core CPI (not plotted in Figure 7 in
order to maintain its clarity and comparability with
Figure 6), but such policy errors as this caused were
not large enough to do real damage. Headline CPI
inflation was above its 2 percent target too often for
comfort, but at least it stayed below 3 percent
between mid-2003 and mid-2008, exceeding this
upper bound only in the late summer of 2008.
Recent UK experience also illustrates the
potentially harmful effects of monetary poli-
cymakers’ focusing on an inappropriate price index.
As did the United States a little earlier, the United
Kingdom is now seeing its housing bubble collapse,
but, unlike the Fed, the Bank of England is a formal
CPI inflation targeter: at 2 percent since December
2003, with particular attention given to keeping the
rate below 3 percent, a goal it largely achieved even
as house prices boomed. However, although it bears
the same label as Canada’s broadly based CPI, the
UK’s index is not equivalent and covers a narrower
range of goods. It is, in fact, the European har-
monized index of consumer prices as applied to local
data, and although it is not a core index, inasmuch as
it does include food and energy, it takes no account
at all of the costs associated with the owner
occupancy of housing. This extraordinary omission
makes it a dubious tool for measuring inflation in an
economy such as that of the United Kingdom, with
an owner-occupancy rate of about 70 percent, and in
which house prices – and, therefore, that component
of the cost of living associated with the provision of
shelter – have until recently been rising at double-
digit rates in many areas.
Not surprisingly, the UK retail price index (RPI),
which does account for owner-occupancy costs and
is roughly equivalent to the Canadian CPI, has risen
significantly faster in recent years (see Figure 8).
Had the Bank of England been targeting this index
– or even the variant that it targeted before 2003,
which ignores mortgage interest while accounting
for other owner-occupancy costs – it is hard to
believe that UK monetary policy would not have
| 8 Commentary 278
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Figure 7: Canada – CPI, CPIC, and ‘Core’ CPIC, Year-over-Year Growth Rates, Quarterly
Sources: Bank of Canada and Statistics Canada.Commentary 278 | 9
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7 A discussion of the details of the United Kingdom’s shift of target price index in 2003 is beyond the scope of this Commentary. Suffice it to note
that the decision was taken not by the Bank of England, but by the chancellor of the exchequer for political reasons having to do with preparing
the country for the possible adoption of the euro as its currency. Not all of the UK CPI’s systematic tendency to produce lower inflation estimates
than the RPI stems from its omission of owner-occupancy costs. Some of it is due to its use of geometric rather than arithmetic weights. In recent
years, however, the treatment of housing has been a significant factor. Details of these UK indices are to be found on the web site of the UK
Statistics Authority: http://www.statistics.gov.uk.
tightened sooner, with salutary effects not just on
inflation but on the local housing market, too.
7
Monetary Policy and Asset Markets 
Even if asset market upheavals in the United States
and the United Kingdom did not arise entirely
unheralded by prior upswings in inflation – and
even if a CPI-inflation-targeting Fed or an RPI-
targeting Bank of England had begun to tighten
earlier so that the housing booms in those countries
might have ended earlier and with less drama –
none of this quite establishes the sufficiency of a
successfully achieved low-inflation target such as
Canada’s for asset market stability. Experience shows
that serious asset market crises sometimes can
happen with only a rather mild increase in inflation
preceding them, and occasionally with none at all.
The 1929 US stock market crash did occur. More
recently, the dot-com bubble developed in the
United States and, to a lesser extent, in Canada and
elsewhere without inflation rising to a level that
alarmed even a formal inflation targeter. And
hindsight about the potential significance of its rise
notwithstanding, Japanese inflation was still below 3
percent in 1990. These facts require an explanation. 
Some Common Characteristics of Asset 
Market Bubbles
Markets for real assets – usually sector specific rather
than for investment goods in general – are, like the
financial sector, almost always heavily involved in
crises (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). In recent
experience, only the October 1987 stock market









































Figure 8: UK – CPI and RPI, Year-over-Year Growth Rates, Quarterly
Source: UK Office for National Statistics.| 10 Commentary 278
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crash was confined to financial markets. The dot-com
bubble saw a run up not only in the stock prices of
high-tech firms, but also in the volume of output
they produced. In addition to creating serious
problems in stock markets and on the balance sheets
of firms that had granted generous credit to enable
their customers to purchase newly produced
equipment, the bursting bubble also left behind it a
great deal of newly produced, unwanted equipment.
In the housing bubble, it was not only the prices of
existing homes that increased dramatically; the
volume of new construction also soared. Although
banks, bond insurers, and other financial institutions
have been highly conspicuous and much discussed
victims of the subsequent crisis, US builders have also
been left with large unsold inventories of houses and
condominiums, while countless households have seen
equity in their homes shrink or even vanish
altogether, with further real effects on the economy,
not all of which have yet materialized.
Another recurrent feature of asset market bubbles
is a mismatch between expectations of the returns to
be realized in one or more particular lines of
economic activity and the costs of borrowing in
order to pursue them.
8 Sometimes these mismatches
are well grounded in the facts of the case, arising
from technical innovations that make particular
types of capital equipment more productive than
the economy-wide average and their creation and
deployment abnormally profitable. In such circum-
stances, high profit expectations and an accompany-
ing boom are well justified, of course, but a justified
boom can turn into an unsustainable bubble when
expectations become exaggerated and begin to feed
upon themselves, a development much easier to
recognize after the event than while it is occurring.
Even so, this is surely what happened in the late
1990s in the high-tech sector. 
On the other hand, the profit-enhancing
innovation that sets things in motion can occur on
the lending side of capital markets, making it
cheaper to service a particular sector. Enhanced
profit expectations often are initially justified in the
wake of such an innovation, but once again, an
ensuing boom can turn into a bubble by becoming
exaggerated. The origin of the US sub-prime
mortgage fiasco and the UK housing bubble in
financial innovations, both in the mortgage market
itself and in securitization techniques that seemed to
make mortgage lending safer and cheaper than it
had previously been, is all too well documented.
And one can explain the anomaly that the 1987
crisis was confined to financial markets along these
lines, too, for it originated in the emergence of new
ways of financing mergers and acquisitions that
made the reorganization of the ownership and man-
agement of many corporations, but not the
expansion of their output, unusually profitable. 
The Roles of Credit and Money
Wherever mismatches between expected returns and
the cost of borrowing originate, the longer they
persist and the more widely they reach across sectors,
the more likely they are to generate over-optimistic
profit expectations. The more pervasive these mis-
matches are in any instance, the greater the risk of
their creating a bubble and the more serious the con-
sequences of its ultimate collapse. And to this, one
should add that the more widely spread is such a
mismatch, the more likely it is to give rise to an
increase in the economy’s overall inflation rate as
well. This is because the credit creation that fuels any
bubble also involves, as a by-product, the creation of
new deposit money, which, having been spent by its
initial borrowers, then has the potential to remain in
circulation and drive up prices in general across the
economy or to be turned into close substitutes for
such money, with expansionary consequences for its
velocity of circulation.
9 An asset market boom thus
begins by setting prices rising in the markets directly
8 The next few paragraphs draw heavily on the interwar literature discussed in Laidler (2003), where references to a representative selection of this
work are to be found. As the reader will see, the arguments presented below sometimes hinge on explicit consideration of the effects of policy on
particular sectors of the economy, issues which much of the macroeconomics literature that has dominated policy debates since the 1940s has
obscured because of its concentration on the behaviour of such variables as the price level and aggregate demand and supply, and its consequent
neglect of the variations in relative prices and the structure of demand and supply that so often underlie them. The importance of Leijonhufvud’s
work (for example, 1968, 1982) in drawing attention to these matters should be acknowledged.
9 The velocity of circulation is the number of times a unit of money changes hands in a given period. It is customary, not to say easier, to measure
this not as a raw turnover statistic – transactions velocity, as the jargon has it – but relative to the volume of income that the economy generates
over the same period: income velocity.Commentary 278 | 11
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affected by new lending, but prices elsewhere in the
economy have a tendency to play catch-up before
long as second- and subsequent-round effects, fed by
the money that this lending creates, are felt. 
Though an economy-wide boom fed by overex-
pansionary monetary policy and accompanied by
generally rising prices is the limiting – perhaps even
the typical – outcome of such processes if they are
allowed to continue for very long, economy-wide
price inflation is not quite one of their inevitable
and immediate consequences. A growing economy’s
demand for money and its close substitutes
normally expands over time and is also subject to a
nontrivial degree of random variation, thus creating
a certain amount of room for credit creation to
boost, and eventually destabilize, particular markets
without at the same time imparting an overall infla-
tionary impulse to the money supply and/or the
stock of liquid assets more generally and thence to
the economy at large. The fact that financial market
problems are often heralded by a rise in the overall
inflation rate – sometimes large enough to trigger
offsetting policies quickly enough to prevent them
developing into a full-blown crisis – suggests that
such an eventuality is not the norm, but the logic of
the creation of credit, money, and near-money and
their effects on the structure of relative prices and
the price level dictate that it clearly can happen.
The foregoing argument tells us that, in addition
to a not quite reliable tendency for prices in general
to rise, financial crises should also be preceded by a
step up in the expansion of credit and money
aggregates.
10The literature on these matters is still
developing and the evidence is indecisive about
whether the asset (credit) or liability (money) side of
the banking system’s balance sheet is the more
relevant, but it apparently favours broader over
narrower aggregates as leading indicators of financial
instability. Figures 9 and 10 follow these hints by
displaying the growth rates since the mid-1990s of
the ratio of a rather broad monetary aggregate to
real gross domestic product (GDP): M2+ gross for
Canada, and M2 adjusted for “sweep accounts” (see
Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones 2006, 2008) for
the United States. These conform to the basic story
already told earlier, even though the recent financial
crisis was preceded by substantial innovations in the
creation of new short-term securities that, though
close money substitutes, do not figure in these con-
ventionally measured aggregates. Thus, there is no
Canadian equivalent to the above-trend growth of
broad money experienced in the United States
during the dot-com boom – at least on these
measures. Moreover, although both countries saw a
prompt and rapid increase in the money stock after
the dot-com collapse, in the United States the
expansion persisted for longer and brought about a
significantly larger cumulative change in this par-
ticular liquidity measure’s ratio to GDP than it did
in Canada. The latest Canadian data show a burst of
liquidity creation as a response to financial market
stress similar to that which followed the bursting of
the dot-com bubble; it is to be hoped that, as with
the earlier episode, the Bank of Canada will ensure
that it turns out to be temporary, once financial
markets stabilize.
11
Inflation Targeting and the Financial System
The logical links between the foregoing analysis of
how asset market instability can be generated and the
mechanics of inflation targeting as it is currently
practiced are worth clarifying at this stage. Doing so
facilitates discussion of the interrelationships between
the policy responses this instability calls for and the
measures needed to keep inflation on track.
12
The standard framework within which inflation
targeting is usually discussed links the time path of
actual inflation relative to the general public’s expec-
10 This tendency has been noted in work associated with the BIS and in recent contributions by, for example, Congdon (2005) and Adalid and
Detken (2007). Bordo and Wheelock (2003) show that the association between rising growth rates of money and credit and asset market booms is
a longstanding one, being clearly visible even in nineteenth-century US data.
11 Unfortunately, at the time of writing, US data that would enable a comparison to be made with this Canadian response are not available due to
the lag in the availability of sweep-adjusted monetary aggregates.
12 Woodford (2002) provides an account of this framework that is sufficiently extensive, thorough, and technically sophisticated to warrant the label
canonical. It has important intellectual roots in the work of the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell (1898) from whom Woodford borrows the title
of his own book. A detailed and up-to-date account of how policy is actually implemented on a day-by-day basis in Canada is given by Engert,




















































Figure 9: Canada – Ratio of a Broad Monetary Aggregate to GDP















































Figure 10: USA – Ratio of a Broad Monetary Aggregate to GDP
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve Board and Cynamon et al. (2008).Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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tations about it to the economy’s “output gap,” and
pictures the latter as systematically responsive to the
very short-term interest rates that the central bank
controls. It then derives rules for changing the latter
in reaction to variations in actual and expected
inflation and to the above-mentioned gap, which, in
turn, emanate from underlying shocks to the level of
aggregate demand in the economy and its sus-
tainable level of aggregate supply. Important in the
design of such rules are views about the appropriate
pace for bringing inflation back to target after any
deviation, which, in turn, hinge upon the need to
ensure that the policy regime does not end up gen-
erating longer-tem instability as a consequence of
inappropriate short-term responses. Crucially, fur-
thermore, though variations in expected inflation
are understood to be potentially subject to policy
influence, this framework treats the other shocks to
which policy ought to respond as arising inde-
pendently of its conduct. 
This standard framework usually abstracts from
two matters that have already figured in our earlier
discussion and are particularly important for under-
standing the interdependence of inflation control
policies and asset market issues. First, and quite
evidently, the interest rates that proximately matter
for the demand for goods and services in any sector
of the economy, and hence for the overall output
gap, are not those that the central bank sets, but
those, explicit and implicit, that firms and
households actually pay for the funds they spend on
goods and services. Second, it is not the absolute
values of borrowing rates that matter, but their level
relative to the returns, both implicit and explicit,
expected on the uses to which borrowed funds are
to be put, and which, in turn, might not always be
independent of the stance of monetary policy or
expectations about its future course. 
These considerations obviously are significant in
times of financial instability, when risk premiums
on various types of securities are likely to be volatile.
But they can be at work even in a tranquil macro-
economic environment, because here it seems
plausible that interest rate spreads within the
financial system might narrow over time as per-
ceptions of risk diminish, that ultimate borrowers’
assessments of the profitability of investment might
simultaneously increase, and, hence, that any given
level of policy interest rates will come to imply not
so much a steady-over-time policy stance, but one
that is becoming progressively easier. If this is so,
then the economy’s vulnerability not just to an asset
market boom, but also to rising inflation, will
indeed increase precisely as a consequence of the
persistence of macroeconomic tranquility.
13
If there are other factors that can shift the rela-
tionship between the overnight rate and the
economy’s output gap than policy-induced changes
in the rate, variations in inflation expectations and
exogenous shocks to aggregate demand and supply
in the real economy, then monetary policy needs to
take account of them. The standard approach to
inflation targeting gives no help in understanding
how this should be done, and the matter is surely
not straightforward. About all that one can say
about it in general is that, when policy interest rates
are set, careful attention should be paid to variability
in the linkages between these rates and those that
impinge more immediately upon the demand for
goods and services – not to say to the influence of
expectations about future monetary policy on
investors’ expectations. The stability here that
standard analysis takes for granted is, at best, a
feature of the system only in tranquil economic
times, which might themselves tend to erode it.
Even so, none of this implies that policy interest rate
settings should be aimed at influencing asset market
behaviour per se, in the sense that they should be
diverted from their medium-term inflation control
task to the immediate one of pricking incipient
bubbles. It implies only that policymakers need to
bear in mind that rigid rules for setting interest rates
can become misleading over time, even where the
task of policy seems to be the maintenance of
already well-established inflation stability. 
13 This is, of course, a way of restating the basis of what we earlier termed the BIS view of these matters, which makes it clear that the latter also
involves an empirical judgment that these forces tend to affect the financial system’s fragility before they begin to produce overall inflationary ten-
dencies. Borio and Haibin (forthcoming) have recently suggested that we should think about the effects of monetary policy on perceptions and
the pricing of risk as integral parts of its tranmission mechanism that are neglected by standard analysis.Sectoral Issues and the Limits of Monetary Policy 
Variations in expectations about the profitability of
doing business in particular sectors of the economy,
when they remain well grounded in the funda-
mentals of agents’ tastes and the technology and
resource endowments available to them, lie at the
very heart of the market economy’s ability efficiently
to exploit technical advances and financial inno-
vations. The relative price movements associated
with such variations provide signals that resources
can be used more productively in the sectors in
question than elsewhere. Asset markets exist
precisely to transmit such signals and to enable
borrowers and lenders to respond to them.
Inherent in these mechanisms, however, is the risk
of bubbles: when agents overestimate the returns to
be realized in a sector, assets associated with it
become overvalued, attracting more activity to the
sector, which further bids up prices, and so on, in an
upward spiral. Real resources will be devoted to the
sector’s expansion so long as the spiral persists. With
the passage of time, when errors are revealed and
asset prices fall, those real resources are left stranded.
This aftermath was all too visible in the large
numbers of empty office buildings in many cities in
the early 1990s, in the large stocks of fibre-optic and
other high-tech equipment in North America at the
beginning of the millennium, and, more recently, in
the large inventories of unsold housing stock in the
United States and elsewhere. 
In the light of all this, it would certainly be
desirable to have in place a policy framework that
encouraged just those degrees of expansion and con-
traction in various sectors of the economy that were
justified by ever-changing economic fundamentals,
while simultaneously forestalling mistakes. The
question remains, however, just what tools, if any,
are well adapted to these purposes. It is a com-
monplace that region-specific monetary policy is
impossible. The Bank of Canada sets just one
overnight interest rate for all regions of the country,
even when there are large disparities in economic
performance among them. But the Bank also sets
just one overnight interest rate for its transactions
with the financial institutions that lend to all sectors
of the economy. Ensuring that asset market
behaviour at the sector- and firm-specific levels
remains grounded in economic fundamentals,
therefore, is not a task for monetary policy. Such
behaviour is better tackled with regulatory and
supervisory measures – with respect to accounting
standards and risk-management practices, for
example – or even by moral suasion.
14
In short, although there is more to the main-
tenance of a stable monetary and financial
environment than the control of inflation, the
policy tools that are devoted to the latter end should
not be diverted into attempts to forestall asset
market bubbles, a task to which supervisory and
regulatory powers are better adapted. Those powers
need not even be vested in the central bank to be
deployed effectively. In Canada, they belong to
other institutions, the most important of which are
federal: the Office of the Supervisor of Financial
Institutions and the Canadian Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Whatever the formal division of
labour between the central bank and other insti-
tutions, close and continuous cooperation among
them is essential, as Freedman and Goodlet (2007)
stress. Any policy framework to maintain monetary
and financial stability must allow for the possibility
that it will sometimes fail to prevent asset market
bubbles. As recent events have demonstrated all too
clearly, the financial turbulence that follows the
bursting of a bubble requires not just the inter-
vention of regulators in specific parts of the financial
sector, but also the creation of liquidity for par-
ticular institutions and for markets in general.
Obviously, these responses are more likely to be
effective if they are coordinated, and the last of them
is quintessentially a task for the central bank. It is
also one whose execution potentially impinges upon
the bank’s ability to keep its medium-term policies
towards inflation on track. 
14 This is not to say that any regulatory and supervisory framework will do. On the contrary, its design and operation raise a host of difficult and, in
the current state of knowledge, even unresolved issues. Freedman and Goodlet (2007, 9-18) and Milne (2008) discuss these issues extensively;
their studies should be regarded as complementary to this one.
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Monetary Policy in the Wake of
Financial Crises 
In the days before the First World War, when
commodity convertibility anchored the price level,
the theory and practice of central banking paid
attention to the institution’s responsibility not just
for maintaining that convertibility, but also for
ensuring the financial system’s continuing viability
and integrity. Then as now, it was understood that a
market economy cannot function smoothly if its
financial system is under stress, and that instability
there can have adverse consequences not just for
those whose mistakes have caused it, but also for
innocent agents both within that system and
beyond its bounds.
The Lender of Last Resort 
The idea of intervening in markets even after the
event, let alone before it, to protect participants
from the consequences of their own actions (beyond
the enforcement of laws against outright fraud) was
essentially unheard of a century ago, but it was
widely accepted that the mitigation of damage to
innocent third parties was an appropriate task for
the central bank. Specifically, the injunctions that
came to define the bank’s role as lender of last resort
in the face of financial crises were that it should be
ready to lend freely to particular institutions that
found themselves illiquid but solvent, while
allowing the insolvent to fail, and that it should
provide by whatever means were needed sufficient
liquidity (in the form of its own cash and deposit
liabilities) to financial markets more generally so
that their participants could continue with their
ordinary business in the face of the increased
uncertainty and low confidence that characterize
such times.
15These injunctions are just as relevant
under today’s monetary policy regimes, where price-
level behaviour is anchored by inflation goals, as
when commodity convertibility was the norm.
Though, as we shall now see, different monetary
policy arrangements dictate certain differences in
their implementation, a difficulty common to
lender-of-last-resort activities under any regime is
that the line between solvency and liquidity on
which so much seems to hinge, and which seems so
clear in principle, is anything but in practice.
Solvency and Liquidity
This problem arises because, during a financial
crisis, and regardless of its origin, the location of the
line between solvency and mere illiquidity for any
individual financial institution is not independent
of the behaviour of the central bank.
16 An
institution that lacks the cash needed to meet its
current commitments and cannot raise it through
loans must sell assets. At this point, it is certainly
illiquid, but its solvency depends upon the prices at
which sales can be consummated, and during a
crisis these will depend upon the amount of support
that the central bank offers to the system overall. If
there are many would-be sellers but the volume of
central bank support is large enough to match the
pressures they create, all will be well. If the scale of
that support is relatively small, however, asset prices
will be driven down and initially sound balance
sheets will be undermined. So, as an asset market
crisis develops, how many financial institutions
become insolvent (and hence, according to the
standard injunction, unworthy of lender-of-last-
resort support) and how many remain solvent but
illiquid (and hence, again according to that
15 It is usual to associate the analysis of the central bank as lender of last resort with Walter Bagehot (1873), but it in no way detracts from this book’s
classic status, not least as an influence on the creation of the US Federal Reserve system in 1913, that its author had neither the first nor even the
final and correct word on all aspects of its subject matter. Before Bagehot (and among many others), there were Francis Baring (1797), who actually
coined the phrase “dernier résort” to refer to the Bank of England’s role in the financial system of that time, Henry Thornton (1802), and Ralph
Hawtrey (1932). On all this and its significance for current issues, see Laidler (2004).
16 One essential feature of a bank is that it borrows at a shorter term than it lends. There is, therefore, as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed in a now
classic article, a risk that a crisis, taking the form of a run on its liabilities, can develop essentially spontaneously for even a sound and well-run bank. It
will occur if each of its depositors for some reason comes to expect that all the others are about to withdraw their funds. Given this expectation, it
becomes rational for each depositor, and therefore for all of them, to try to withdraw before the bank’s liquid reserves are exhausted – that is, imme-
diately – hence precipitating the bank’s failure. Diamond and Dybvig highlight deposit insurance, which guarantees every depositor against losses in the
event of a bank’s failure, as a way of eliminating such behaviour, but the presence of a lender of last resort in the system works in the same direction.injunction, worthy of such help) depends on the
scale and promptness of the support. 
Furthermore, because the behaviour of asset
holders is forward looking, firmly established expec-
tations that lender-of-last-resort help will be
promptly available should a financial crisis ever
develop can themselves affect its seriousness – and
even the likelihood of its occurring in the first
place.
17The potentially stabilizing effects of lender-
of-last-resort activities are relevant beyond the
boundaries of the financial system. The latter exists
to provide the credit agents in the rest of the
economy require to carry on their everyday business
and the money they use in their market trans-
actions. The more extensive are liquidity and
solvency problems within the system and the more
widespread are concerns of their worsening, the less
able is the system to carry out these basic tasks and
the more will the real economy begin to suffer. This,
in turn, further exacerbates the financial system’s
own difficulties, both directly as previously sound
firms and households begin to default on their
debts, and indirectly as growing sluggishness in the
economy leads to downward pressure on equity
prices. Thus, any financial crisis, even an incipient
one, carries with it the threat of a downward spiral
that involves the financial system and then the rest
of the economy. The quicker and more vigorous is
the central bank’s first response to trouble, not to
mention the more confidently expected it is, the less
likely is the spiral to get started. 
Moral Hazard
Criticism of central bank support for banks and
related institutions on the grounds that it favours
the financial sector over other agents, therefore, is
misconceived, but such support has its perils never-
theless. To the extent that central bank intervention
aimed at rescuing innocent third parties and sta-
bilizing the economy also supports financial
institutions that really did make bad loans – not to
mention their overoptimistic customers – and to the
extent that intervention creates expectations of
rescue in future times of trouble, so moral hazard
encourages even more carelessness next time round.
The dilemma implicit here is real, but no clear res-
olution to it is to be found in the distinction
between insolvency and illiquidity because, to
repeat, the location of the line between them
depends upon the central bank’s actions. Faced with
a financial crisis, where speed of response is of the
essence, a lender of last resort must act in the almost
certain knowledge that it is going to err in one
direction or the other. In which direction, and by
how much, are questions to which answers will be
available only after the event. 
Pre-1914 commodity-based monetary systems had
some built-in protection against creating moral
hazard through overgenerous provision of lender-of-
last-resort facilities. These regimes required central
banks to ensure the continued convertibility of their
currencies, and in order to attract the necessary short-
term capital inflows during crises, they were impelled
to increase their policy interest rates to levels that also
tended to deter any but the genuinely needy – but in
the longer run sound (in their own estimation) –
domestic last-resort borrowers. 
No such mechanism is built into today’s regimes,
whether formally based on inflation targets or not.
But during crises, a central bank must still reconcile
the pursuit of short-term stability with the longer-
term goal of keeping moral hazard in check (Engert,
Selody, and Wilkins 2008, 75-76). Particularly if it
is a formal inflation targeter, the central bank’s other
obligation is to maintain not exchange-rate stability
(today’s equivalent of commodity convertibility),
but inflation stability. Given our usual habit of
C.D. Howe Institute
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17 This interdependence between liquidity and solvency lies at the heart of current controversies about the appropriateness of applying “mark to
market” accounting rules to financial institutions in times of crisis. It is true that marking to market when the market is not functioning is likely to
result in some institutions being classified as insolvent and, on a strict interpretation of lender-of-last-resort principles, denied support when, over
a longer period, the market is likely to recover and so are they, and that less stringent accounting principles would prevent this occurring. Our own
inclination, however, is to address this problem by combining strict measurement standards with operating procedures that leave room for the self-
conscious exercise of forbearance on the part of the lender, rather than by trying to build opportunities for such forbearance into accounting
conventions.thinking that a central bank’s key activity in pursuit
of this latter obligation is the manipulation of a very
short-term interest rate, it is not immediately clear
whether or how this overriding longer-term
obligation impinges on the choices the bank must
also make about lender-of-last-resort actions. 
Inflation Targeting during Financial Turbulence 
The trouble with this usual way of thinking is that it
leads us to ignore the fact that in any circumstances,
tranquil or otherwise, the linkages between policy
interest rates and aggregate demand are indirect and
work through the financial system. This intellectual
shortcut is never quite safe, but it becomes positively
dangerous in times of financial turbulence. As recent
experience has shown all too clearly, policy rates then
become unreliable indicators of what private sector
borrowers must actually pay, while loans at any price
become harder or even impossible to get for some. At
such times, policy needs to respond to developments
within the financial system, not necessarily in order to
change the monetary conditions impinging on
expenditure decisions in the real economy (though
such a change might be called for) but perhaps merely
to preserve their pre-existing stance. Under inflation
targeting, generous provision of liquidity and lower
policy interest rates are complementary measures
during crises, as they were not under commodity con-
vertibility.
For an inflation-targeting central bank, then,
there is no inherent contradiction between its obli-
gations to preserve financial stability and its
longer-term goals. Were it blindly to follow rules
of thumb derived from past experience about the
level of the overnight rate appropriate to keep
inflation on target when asset markets become
turbulent, and were it to hesitate about providing
lender-of-last-resort support to the system, the
central bank would quickly end up presiding over
a monetary contraction and a real economic
downturn that would cause the inflation target to
be undershot. This would be true, furthermore,
whether the problems had originated at home, as
with the Fed during the past year, or abroad, as
with the Bank of Canada, or even whether they
were the consequence of one of those rare asset
market bubbles that are not prefigured by an
increase in inflation. 
Even so, we must add two qualifications here.
First, and obviously, too much (or too little)
stimulus for the economy’s medium-term good can
be imparted by lender-of-last-resort activities and
associated cuts in policy interest rates. The
automatic checks on the creation of moral hazard
that were built into regimes based on commodity
convertibility are not present under inflation
targeting, where more is left to the judgment of pol-
icymakers. When judgment is in play, misjudgment
can occur all too easily, as the overexpansionary
nature of US policy after 2001 suggests.
Second, and closely related, the chances that an
overexpansionary policy miscalculation will do real
damage depend on, among other things, the level of
inflation expectations and the firmness with which
they are held when stimulus is needed to cope with
financial instability. Recent experience is once again
instructive. When the Bank of Canada began to cope
with the recent bout of market turbulence, domestic
inflation expectations were firmly anchored by an
explicit and credible target, and the inflation rate itself
was well within the target’s margin of error. In the
United States, on the other hand, the Fed had no
firm targets to begin with, and faced actual inflation
that had been running at an uncomfortably high rate
for some time. It is hard to believe, therefore, that the
Fed recently has had as much room for expansionary
error as has the Bank of Canada.
Implications for Canada’s 2011 Decisions
In this Commentary, we have argued that well-
defined and credible inflation targets help to avoid
asset market instability. Moreover, when such
instability does arise, there is no policy disconnect
implicit in coping with it through lender-of-last-
resort operations while continuing to pursue stable
inflation for the longer run. We have further
suggested that expectations that lender-of-last-resort
facilities will be deployed promptly in the event of
instability also might help to reduce its severity, and
even the likelihood of its occurring at all.
Nevertheless, even a regime that combines suc-
cessful inflation targeting with confidently held
expectations about the availability of lender-of-last-
resort facilities cannot offer complete protection
against locally generated asset market problems, let
alone those originating abroad. The flexible
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exchange rate that is inflation targeting’s necessary
accompaniment is an excellent device for facilitating
the real economy’s smooth adjustment to relative
price shocks originating in world markets for goods
and services, but it does not shield Canadian
financial institutions from upheavals in the inter-
national financial markets into which they are so
deeply integrated.
A Broader Mandate for Monetary Policy
When it comes to the Bank of Canada’s 2011
agreement with the minister of finance, our con-
clusions imply, first, that, desirable though it might
be to continue to put price-level behaviour at the
centre of monetary policy, consideration should also
be given to recognizing explicitly the Bank’s lender-
of-last-resort responsibilities. Such an
acknowledgement would ratify the status quo,
rather than add anything to the Bank’s tasks, but,
appropriately drafted, it could help to avoid any rep-
etition of the public confusion about the Bank’s
policy priorities that the events of last year
generated, and make it easier for the Bank to
mitigate future financial market problems. The
acknowledgment should state that, although a well-
behaved price level helps to promote asset market
stability, it does not ensure it. It should also make
clear that, to the extent coping with instability
requires the creation of liquidity, this is the Bank’s
responsibility, which it should exercise without jeop-
ardizing longer-term price-level goals. Such a
statement surely would enhance the transparency of
monetary policy in and of itself, and provide a
useful reference point for ongoing discussions of the
Bank’s activities.
It has also been argued above, with reference to
Japan in the late 1980s, and the US and UK more
recently, that the behaviour of the price level, even
within parameters that might define an apparently
successful inflation-targeting regime, can indicate if
policy is increasing the likelihood of asset market
bubbles, and that this has implications for how
those parameters are set that need to be considered
before 2011. This is not to say that financial
stability questions are the only ones at issue here, or
that others might not weigh against taking steps
aimed solely at dealing with them. But they are
relevant and need to be considered when choices are
made concerning the price index to be targeted, its
rate of increase, the margins of errors that the
regime permits, and whether targets should be set
for the time path of the index or simply, as now, its
rate of change. 
Targeting an Appropriate Price Index
Canada’s current monetary policy regime targets the
inflation rate of the CPI – so-called headline
inflation – and recent episodes of financial
instability here and elsewhere seem to confirm the
wisdom of this choice. It has long been argued that
the use of a broadly based and easily understood
index lends transparency and credibility to an
inflation-targeting regime, and reduces the chances
that the authorities will miss an upturn in inflation
when relative prices are changing. Recent US and
UK experience has added weight to this argument,
which, in the past, has usually been directed against
overreliance on core indices that omit various food
and energy prices.
18
The UK case also shows the relevance of an index
that does not omit owner-occupancy costs.
Moreover, the fact that owner-occupied housing is
an asset recently subject to a bubble reminds us that
some commentators (see, for example, Goodhart
and Hoffman 2000) have long advocated a version
of the BIS doctrines discussed earlier, arguing for a
monetary policy aimed at a price index that pays
attention to the prices of a broad range of assets,
including financial assets.
19 However, our case for
paying attention to housing costs is not easily
18 It should nevertheless be said explicitly that none of this argues against the use of core inflation measures as indicators of future headline inflation when
policy decisions are made, so long as careful attention is given to the underlying factors that are producing differences between the two rates before policy
decisions are taken. What we are arguing is that the target of policy should be headline inflation, not that each and every monthly shift in this variable
should elicit a pre-programmed policy response that ignores information about how long it is likely to persist. Core inflation sometimes contains such
information, and other information, too, is often available that can help policymakers distinguish between these two circumstances.
19 There are also longstanding theoretical arguments in favour of using indices that include asset prices (see Alchian and Klein 1973), which,
however, do not address the important practical questions surrounding policy transparency stressed above.Commentary 278 | 19
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extended to other assets. It is based on the
observation that expenditure on shelter is a
component of the current cost of living and, for
owner occupiers, is visibly linked to house prices.
This, we suggest, is why such expenditure is
accounted for in Canada’s CPI, why it is quite
appropriate for the Bank of Canada to target the
CPI, and why the Bank of England moved into
dangerous territory when its target was switched to
an index that ignored these costs. Crucially,
variations in the prices of most other assets, whether
financial or real, do not impinge directly on the
current cost of living as consumers understand it,
and to broaden the Bank of Canada’s targeted index
to include them would significantly reduce
monetary policy’s transparency to the general
public. If it is believed that asset prices contain
information not available elsewhere about the
economy’s future behaviour, however, there is
nothing to prevent the Bank from using this
information in making its policy decisions in exactly
the same way as it currently uses core inflation
measures – namely, as a sometimes useful indicator
of the future behaviour of the price index whose
time path it is required to stabilize. 
Paying Attention to Upswings in Inflation
Also implicit in our analysis are views about the
desirable level of Canada’s post-2011 inflation rate
and whether targets should be set for inflation itself
or the time path of the price level. We suggest that,
though rising inflation is not quite a necessary
forerunner of asset market troubles – the United
States in 1929 is the clearest counterexample to
overgeneralization here – even a mild but sustained
upswing can foreshadow trouble. The reason seems
to be that rising inflation itself can be a symptom of
the excessive credit and money creation that starts
an asset bubble; in turn, this early warning property
of rising inflation implies that there is something to
be said for a policy framework that forces attention
to be paid to such a phenomenon sooner rather
than later.
20
On this count, then, it is worth considering a
regime that is intolerant of upswings that take
inflation significantly above its central target rate or,
at the very least, forces the authorities to take explicit
notice of them. This could be accomplished by
treating the upper boundary of inflation’s target range
not just as an indicator of a reasonable margin of
error, as it is now, but as a limit that requires a policy
response – or perhaps by merely requiring a public
explanation of why the bound has been reached,
along the lines of the Bank of England governor’s
letter to the chancellor of the exchequer.
21
Inflation versus Price Level Targets
As for the relative merits of price-level targeting and
inflation targeting, it has been suggested above that
asset market bubbles are associated with overestimates
of the profitability of investing in particular sectors of
the economy, and that the potential for such errors –
which are essentially about the likely future behaviour
of relative prices – increases with the duration of any
bout of generally inflationary credit and money
creation. If this suggestion is considered in isolation
from all other considerations (which, of course, it
should not be), then price-level targeting emerges as
the riskier option. To see why, consider what the
response of monetary policy would have to be if,
starting from an “on target” position, inflation and,
therefore, the price level fell below their desired paths.
With an inflation target, monetary policy would have
to become more expansionary than the norm for long
enough to bring inflation back on track. With a
price-level target, however, policy would have to be
more expansionary for longer, creating more space for
errors about the future course of relative prices in par-
ticular markets, whose future unwinding might then
have the capacity to destabilize the financial sector. 
One counterargument here is that price-level
targeting should bring more stability than inflation
targeting not only to long-term inflation, and expec-
tations about it, but to the real economy as well
(Ambler 2007). These conclusions, however, are
derived from macroeconomic models that do not
20 We are grateful to Angela Redish and Nicholas Rowe for comments that helped us considerably in clarifying this point.
21 It should be conceded, however, that the considerations favouring such a change might be outweighed by others – for example, by the potentially
adverse effects on the policy regime’s credibility of setting an overambitious upper boundary and then drawing attention to violations of it, or by the
disinflationary policy bias that an asymmetrically firmer upper boundary might create. | 20 Commentary 278
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22 A number of their observations deserve serious attention, among them that the constraints of the gold standard were sufficiently strong that implicit in
it was an escape clause allowing convertibility to be suspended in emergencies, with the parity thereafter perhaps being rebased; that this arrangement,
widely invoked in 1914, caused severe trouble after the First World War; and that price-level targeting might take on a similar characteristic, with
adverse effects on such a regime’s long-term credibility.
permit investigation of the possibility of mistakes
about relative prices developing against the
background of apparently benign aggregate
behaviour. Further work is required on these
matters, because it is not clear that the greater
stability of long-term price-level behaviour, whose
benefits Ambler stresses, does anything to offset the
tendency of a price-level-targeting regime to create
more scope for short-term errors about relative
prices in specific markets to occur and then get out
of hand. In the meantime, it would be unwise to
ignore the chance that longer upswings in inflation
made possible by price-level targeting might permit
a return of the type of credit cycle driven by relative
price errors that characterized economic life under
the gold standard. Commodity convertibility was,
after all, a species of price-level targeting, as Masson
and Shukayev (2008) point out.
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Summing Up
Although it is possible that the macroeconomic
stability which successful inflation targeting brings
can itself increase financial markets’ vulnerability to
instability, markets are nevertheless right (up to a
point at least) to worry less about risk under such a
regime. Moreover, there should be no concern about
this fact provided the central bank remains
conscious of it and adapts to its effects on the trans-
mission mechanisms through which it controls
inflation. Even so, not all inflation-targeting regimes
are equal when it comes to combining low and
stable inflation with well-behaved asset markets.
From this point of view, particularly desirable is a
regime that not only targets a broadly based price
index, but also narrows the scope for long-duration,
though slow, upswings of inflation to get under way
unnoticed. Other factors also need to be taken into
account, however, before one can reach any firm
conclusions about the decisiveness of these consid-
erations for Canada’s post-2011 monetary policy
regime. 
Whatever decisions are made about its precise
configuration, however, that regime must leave the
authorities room to deal with asset market
instability. Even if the chances of such problems
arising for domestic reasons can be reduced by
careful regulation and supervision, they cannot be
eliminated, and they can all too easily be imported
as well. There is more involved here than monetary
policy per se: regulators and supervisors also have
roles to play during crises. But the Bank of Canada’s
ability and willingness to act as a lender of last resort
to the financial system at such times are crucial; as
we have seen over the past year, the Bank
understands this. It would nevertheless enhance
monetary policy’s transparency if the 2011
agreement were explicitly to recognize the Bank’s
responsibility in this regard. Since the exercise of
that responsibility is quite compatible with the
pursuit of longer-run goals for the behaviour of
inflation, such a recognition would seem to require
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